Publications (Chronological)

Peer Reviewed | Book Chapters | Reviews and Other Publications

Peer Reviewed

Miller, Boaz. 2021. When is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate? Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.

Miller, Boaz. 2020. Is Technology Value Neutral? Science, Technology, & Human Values, forthcoming.

Godler, Yigal, Zvi Reich, & Boaz Miller. 2019. Social Epistemology as a New Paradigm for Journalism and Media Studies. New Media and Society, forthcoming.  ‎

Miller, Boaz & Isaac Record. 2017. Responsible Epistemic Technologies: A Social-Epistemological ‎Analysis of Autocompleted Web Search. New Media and Society 19(12) 1945-1963.

Miller, Boaz. 2016. Scientific Consensus and Expert Testimony in Courts: Lessons from the Bendectin Litigation. Foundations of Science 21 (1):15-33.

Miller, Boaz. 2015. What is Hacking’s Argument for Entity Realism? Synthese 193(3): 991-1006

Miller, Boaz. 2015. Why (Some) Knowledge is the Property of a Community and Possibly None of Its Members. The Philosophical Quarterly 65(260): 417-441.

Miller, Boaz. 2014. Catching the WAVE: The Weight-Adjusting Account of Values and Evidence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 47: 69-80.

Miller, Boaz. 2014. Science, Values, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4(2): 253-270.

Miller, Boaz. 2013. When Is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge from Mere Agreement. Synthese 190(7): 1293-1316.

Miller, Boaz & Isaac Record. 2013. Justified Belief in a Digital Age: On the Epistemic Implications of Secret Internet Technologies. Episteme 10(2): 101-118.

Miller, Boaz. 2012. The Rationality Principle Idealized. Social Epistemology 26(1): 3-30.

Miller, Boaz. 2009. What Does It Mean that PRIMES is in P? Popularization and Distortion Revisited. Social Studies of Science 39(2): 257-288.

Book Chapters

Freiman, Ori and Boaz Miller. 2020. Can Artificial Entities Assert? In The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, ed. Sanford C. Goldberg, 415-436. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, Boaz & Ori Freiman. 2020. Trust and Distributed Epistemic Labor. The Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy, edited by Judith Simon, 341-353. New York: Routledge.

Miller, Boaz. 2019. The Social Epistemology of Consensus and Dissent. In The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, eds. David Henderson, Peter Graham, Miranda Fricker & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, 228-237. New York: Routledge.

Record, Isaac & Boaz Miller. 2018. Taking iPhone Seriously: Epistemic Technologies and the Extended Mind. In ‎Extended Knowledge, edited by Duncan Pritchard, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & J. Adam ‎Carter, 105-226. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ‎

Miller, Boaz. 2015. ‘Trust Me – I’m a Public Intellectual’: Margaret Atwood’s and David Suzuki’s Social Epistemologies of ‎Climate Science. In Speaking Power to Truth: Digital Discourse and the Public Intellectual, edited by Michael Keren ‎& Richard Hawkins, 113-128. Athabasca, AB: Athabasca University Press.‎

Reviews and Other Publications

Miller, Boaz. 2011. BOOK REVIEW: McIntyre, Lee. Dark Ages: The Case for a Science of Human Behavior (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2006). Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 5(1): 85-87.

Miller, Boaz. 2005. Thomas Kuhn and the Rationality of Science. Galileo 88: 34‑41 [Hebrew].